In this paper the stability problem for the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics using vector Lyapunov methods is addressed. After introducing the evolutionary stable strategy concept and proving that it is equivalent to being a strict Nash equilibrium, the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics equation is presented. Finally, it is shown that every strict Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable in the associated dynamics via Lyapunov methods. 
Preliminaries Definition 1.A continuous function ϕ : + → + is said to belong to class K if it is strictly increasing, α(0) = 0 and α(r) → ∞ as r → ∞.
Consider the differential system
where f : C( + × n ) → n (x(t, t 0 ) = x 0 ). Suppose that f is smooth enough to guarantee existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence of solutions x(t) = x(t, t 0 , x 0 ) of system 1. Then, the next result takes care of its stability.
for ϕ 1 ,ϕ 2 ∈ K and , the differential inequalitẏ
holds for all (t, x) ∈ + ×B(ρ) ⊂ n where h : + × s + → s is a continuously differentiable function such that h(t, 0) ≡ 0 and h(t, V ) is quasimonotone nondecreasing in V (for all V ∈ s + and t ∈ + ). Let ω(t; w 0 , t 0 ) be the solution of the comparison systeṁ
provided that V (t 0 , x 0 ) ≤ ω 0 . Therefore, the stability properties of the trivial solution ω = 0 of the comparison system imply the corresponding stability properties of x.
Corollary 1.3 In Theorem (1.2): i). If h(t, ω) ≡ 0 we get stability. ii). If h(t, ω)
= −αω, α > 0, we get asymptotic stability. [2] and [3] . Definition 1.5 Let Θ be the polyhedron of mixed strategies profiles, a strategy profile x ∈ Θ is said to be a strict Nash equilibrium if {x} = B(x) the best reply function. Definition 1.6 Let u i : Θ → + , i ∈ I = 1, 2, ...n be the utility function. A strategy profile x ∈ Θ is evolutionary stable if for every strategy y = x there exists some y ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ∈ (0, y ) and with w = y
Remark 1.4 We encorage those readers not familiar with game theory, its basic concepts and mathematical notations, to see
The next result's proof is much in the flavor of the one provided in [2] . Proposition 1.7 A strategy profile x ∈ Θ is evolutionary stable if and only if x is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof 1.8 First assume that x is a strict Nash equilibrium then
).
Now let us prove the converse: Take i ∈ I arbitrary and y
i.e., x i ∈ B i (y) for some i but y i ∈ B i (x) for all i therefore, y i = x i is a Nash equilibrium and {x i } = B i (x) and since i ∈ I = {1, 2..., n} was arbitrary we conclude that {x} = B(x) and therefore x is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Next, the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics is presented. Unlike the single population setting, there are two versions of the continuous time n-population replicator dynamics. We will deal with the one suggested by Taylor [4] which has the form:
with x ∈ Θ, pure strategy h and i ∈ I = {1, 2, ...n}, which by standard Lipshitz arguments has a unique solution.
Main Result Theorem 2.1 Every x ∈ Θ, strict Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable in the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics
Proof 2.2 Let x ∈ Θ, be a strict Nash equilibrium then, x is a vertex of Θ i.e., x i = e 
implying that x is asymptotically stable in the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics.
Remark 2.3
Converse of (2.1) is also true [2] . Therefore, being a strictly Nash equilibrium is equivalent to asymptotic stability.
Conclusions
Asymptotic stability for the continuous time n-population replicator dynamics was shown to hold, in a more natural way than other previous scalar approaches by means of employing vector Lyapunov functions.
